The fact that the President of the United States did not consult or at least inform European leaders of the launch of military operations in Iran did not surprise anyone. However, the continent, which imports almost all of its fossil fuels, will be one of the regions of the planet that will bear the heaviest economic consequences. This situation is to be compared to the White House's taking charge of discussions with Moscow with a view to finding a way out of the war in Ukraine and where Europe, although directly concerned, is kept on the sidelines. This can be explained by Donald Trump's will to power, but this is insufficient. The real reason lies in the weakening of Europe over the past twenty years as a result of major mistakes made in at least three areas: defence, energy and the Commission's obsession with competition. These mistakes have one thing in common: they have penalised France, often under pressure from Germany.

The financial soundness of the euro area was originally conditioned by the fulfilment of criteria set out in the Maastricht Treaty, consisting of ratios of the public deficit and debt to GDP. But at no time was the spending devoted to defence mentioned, let alone taken into account. Thus, a country could be described as rigorous, or even virtuous, if it respected these criteria by devoting only a small part of its budget to military spending. This is the case, among other countries, of Germany. If it had had, in relation to its GDP, the same level of spending as France has had for thirty years, it would have a level of debt very close to that of its neighbour.

The criticisms of the United States are therefore partly justified, but they have nevertheless benefited greatly from it, because few projects carried out by European companies have been carried out, which would have made it possible to provide the continent with a real defence industry competing with the American industry. The most revealing example is undoubtedly the production of combat aircraft. No major EU country has bought Rafale. To date, the main customers have been India, Indonesia, Egypt, the Emirates and Qatar. In Europe, only Greece and Croatia have acquired a few models. Germany, Italy and Spain have chosen the Eurofighter, designed and built in partnership with England but whose engine and a large part of the electronic equipment are American.

The blocking of the future fighter jet project is once again due to industrial rivalries that hide Germany's desire to play a dominant role. The management of the project should fall to Dassault, which has proven itself with the Rafale by designing a model capable of meeting traditional needs, supporting naval forces and carrying nuclear weapons. It will then be able to rely on Airbus' industrial capabilities that have been at the origin of its success in civil aviation. The difficulties of the FCAS project stem from the inability of the States to reach an agreement and not from a weakness in their technical capacities. European defence can only exist if it has the appropriate industrial tools.

So is the Europe of energy. Energy is an essential issue, first and foremost for its sovereignty, since it is a question of protecting the security of supply. This point, which was theoretical in the past, has taken on major importance after Russia's invasion of Ukraine and in recent days with the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz following the war unleashed by the United States and Israel against Iran. It is also a decisive factor for the competitiveness of many industrial sectors and for the protection of household purchasing power, as well as a key element in the fight against global warming.

France and Germany understood this and chose, albeit in different proportions, nuclear power. After the Chernobyl disaster, they even decided, thanks to an alliance between Framatome and Siemens, to design a new reactor model, the European Power Reactor, the EPR, which, thanks to the concept of passive safety, would remedy the weaknesses of the Russian power plant. Unfortunately, the Franco-German agreement did not last and France made the mistake of waiting fifteen years to order the reactor.  Germany, in order to protect its coal mines and then to buy Russian gas, while obtaining the support of the ecologist parties, will then begin its exit from nuclear power.

Berlin will use all its weight to ensure that Brussels imposes increasingly restrictive regulations affecting the competitiveness of this mode of electricity production. France, without realizing how much this would weaken its economy, even more moderately embarked on this path by closing Fessenheim under false pretexts and announcing a drastic reduction in the share of nuclear power in electricity production.

France accepted, without really mobilizing, a regulation of the price of electricity forcing EDF to sell at a loss a substantial part of its nuclear production in the name of sharing the rent, as if the technological and economic success of the construction of the power plants in the 80s and 90s made the company a rentier. Europe, and first and foremost Germany, are paying heavily for these mistakes, since they were the first to be affected by the consequences of the invasion of Ukraine and now by the war with Iran and its consequences on the entire Middle East. Fortunately, Paris has reversed these absurd choices, but how much time and money have been lost.

Europe's third flaw is its obsession with competition. The prohibition of state aid and the use of public procurement policy have deprived governments of major industrial policy instruments. The ban on mergers of companies has been an obstacle to the creation of large European groups capable of resisting their American and Asian competitors. This has encouraged companies to embark on acquisitions outside Europe that have often proved disastrous. The disappearance of flagships such as Alcatel and Lafarge was the direct consequence.

The opening up of major public services, particularly in transport, to competition was also a mistake. Effective spatial planning is based on the provision of accessible means of transport. In the case of the SNCF, new competitors have appeared on the most profitable lines and have certainly sometimes lowered prices, but these are resources that are no longer available for the less profitable lines but just as essential for the populations concerned. To remedy this situation, the company has closed lines and, above all, has gradually moved away from freight transport, for which the rail solution now represents only 10% of traffic, generating heavy pollution and slowing down the necessary reduction in the use of fossil fuels.

Successive international crises have highlighted the decline of Europe's influence in recent years. Its economic weakening resulting from numerous strategic errors is not the only cause of this decline, but it has largely contributed to it. France and Germany have a heavy responsibility in this, the first because it has not been able to defend its interests, the second because it has constantly sought to assert its authority, most often to the detriment of France. But there is no strong Europe if France is weak. It is this trend, which has been going on for twenty years, that it is essential to reverse.