Agence France Trésor, whose mission is to manage the State's debt, publishes an index, the TEC 10, every day, which reflects the financing conditions of the public debt for the 10-year maturity. The figure of 3.30% is the lowest in several months and testifies, contrary to many comments, to the confidence of the markets in France's ability to manage its debt. By way of comparison, the American and British rates are above 4%. In the euro area, the gap with Germany continues to narrow and has fallen to 57 basis points from more than 70 basis points last autumn. The Italian rate has risen back above the French rate, while for weeks the fact that it had fallen slightly below it had been interpreted as a particularly alarming signal.
Another indicator of market confidence in France's financial situation is the success achieved since the beginning of the year by the issuance of Treasury Bills (BTFs) and Medium- and Long-Term Bonds (OATs). Each of the three BTF issues was significantly oversubscribed: €27 billion requested for €7.6 billion. The same was true for long-term debt: 13.5 billion retained for 35 billion requested, as well as for medium-term securities 13.5 billion retained for 35 billion requested. For the issuance of inflation-linked securities in the euro zone, 1.5 billion was retained against 4.4 billion requested.
In this respect, one may wonder what is the point of preferring to issue securities indexed to the euro zone when inflation is above 2% and not to French inflation, which has been very low for several months. This choice is not without consequences on the amount to be paid each year, when these securities reach maturity. Thus, between 2023 and 2025, indexation charges amounted to more than €10 billion. This burden will continue to increase, since the outstanding amount indexed to the euro area was 72 billion at the beginning of the year, compared with only 52 billion for the one indexed to national inflation.
Contrary to alarmist comments, France continues to have a favourable assessment of the financial markets despite a high debt-to-GDP ratio; But this indicator must be interpreted with caution because the denominator is expressed in value. The fastest way to reduce this rate is therefore not to reduce the deficit but to have high inflation, which would penalise savers and purchasing power. This is what happened with Greece at the end of the 2012 crisis, but it has nothing to be proud of. On the other hand, the very low inflation experienced by France, which is a major step forward compared to the years preceding the creation of the euro, makes it more difficult to reduce the debt ratio, compared for example to Germany, which has inflation that persists above 2%, and to Italy.
The ECB's maintenance of interest rates above 2% also weighs on the debt burden as well as on growth. However, thanks to the additional tax revenues generated, this is an essential factor in the restoration of public accounts and the stabilisation of debt. France is therefore, more than the other members of the zone, penalised by this policy. It is perhaps time to put forward these arguments in the face of those, at home as well as among our neighbours, who denounce our indebtedness, which they consider excessive.
The confidence preserved by the financial markets is the result of two undeniable factors. France has a surplus, albeit small, of less than 1% of GDP, in its current account balance. The country is therefore not contributing to weakening the euro zone's external position. This surplus is the result of considerable tourism receipts and income from abroad. These compensate for the heavy deficit in the trade balance in goods. While successive governments have set themselves the objective of restoring the competitiveness of companies since 2012 at the cost of a worsening of public deficits, the maintenance of a strong deficit shows that this policy has failed, which has resulted in unemployment remaining at a high level.
The second factor that has contributed to maintaining confidence is the very high level of household financial savings, which reached a record level in 2025 with more than 9% of gross disposable income. Here again, we must be wary of comparisons, especially with Germany, which is said to have a rate that is similar if not higher. This is the result of a difference in the method of calculation, since there is a funded pension system in which contributions are included in savings, which is not the case for pay-as-you-go schemes.
The foreseeable evolution of the public debt burden has not undermined this confidence either. It comes from three factors; the increase in debt caused by the persistence of deficits, but this is not the most decisive factor. The increasing cost of the indexation charge when a security matures and finally the evolution of market rates which depends on the ECB. The state can curb the accumulation of deficits and have less recourse to securities indexed to euro zone inflation over which it has no control. But he is not in a position to determine the ECB's policy. However, there is nothing to prevent it from making it known that it is artificially penalising France, which, in terms of inflation, is one of the most virtuous countries in the euro zone.
Moreover, if we measure public debt no longer in relation to GDP but in relation to the financial assets of households, once their debt is deducted, we can see that this indicator has changed little over the past thirty years. Household wealth has grown almost as fast as public debt. However, the solvency of a country, like that of an economic agent, depends on its ability to repay its debt, which is thus real. As for the discourse according to which this debt would be passed on to future generations, it ignores the obvious: these generations will inherit, and even much more, money to repay it.
The dramatization of the issue of debt in the public debate stems from an error of analysis. By frightening people, we believe that it will be easier to get unpopular measures accepted. This idea is false because those who are targeted by these measures will fight to have it admitted that it is not they who are at the origin of the problem but "the others".
The debate must therefore focus less on the level of public spending and more on better use. The simplification of the action of the administrations, their debureaucratization and a major territorial reform consisting of reducing the number of local institutions would contribute to the achievement of this objective. But it is not certain that elected officials will easily vote for the reduction of the number of local bodies on which they sit.
The debate on public debt is justified, but the method chosen is not the right one. There is a risk of giving credence to the idea at European level that France is a bad student. This will then reduce its influence on major issues such as energy or defence, without putting in place the real remedies for the French disease.