The multiple crises that have occurred in recent years, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia or the protectionist push of the Trump administration for example, have lent credence to the idea that we are witnessing the end of globalization. However, this has been an essential factor in the evolution of the main economies over the last fifty years and its questioning could have major consequences on the growth and standard of living of the populations concerned, but also on the geopolitical balances.
It all started in the 70s with the emergence of "multinationals". These companies, most often American, had conquered market shares in Europe and then established themselves there. The concern they had aroused, especially in France where "the American challenge" was highlighted, did not last since in turn the large European and Japanese companies followed this path. This movement was amplified in the 1980s with the opening of financial markets, the end of exchange controls almost everywhere and the lowering of customs duties.
The third phase, which occurred with the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall, was marked during the 1990s by relocations. To take advantage of lower labour costs in Eastern Europe or China, which, after the reforms introduced by Deng Xiao Peng, had opened up to foreign investors, companies built supply chains around the world that, in a context of increased competition, made it possible to compete while making enough profits to satisfy their shareholders.
However, these transformations that gave rise to globalization are now being called into question. Threats to the transport of goods, such as the sanctions imposed on several countries, have caused disruptions in the supply chains of strategic raw materials such as Russian gas or spare parts manufactured around the world. The imposition of tariffs and then the withdrawal followed by new threats by the American administration have affected this country's trade with the rest of the world by creating a climate of uncertainty. Finally, the principle of extraterritoriality adopted by the American justice system has affected transactions in dollars and has sometimes led to a withdrawal of countries or companies feeling threatened.
The United States had been at the center of globalization. Does the breakdown of the relationship of trust that existed with its historical allies mean the end of globalisation, as some claim, with the return, particularly in Europe, of the priority given to economic sovereignty? This is far from certain because another major evolution is underway. China is changing. For a long time the factory of the world where large Western firms came to look for subcontractors, the country, thanks to spectacular progress in innovation and the training of a highly qualified workforce, has allowed the birth of large companies capable, in many fields, of competing or even surpassing their Western competitors.
Its leaders perfectly understood the opportunity before them to take over from the Western world and make their country the engine of a new globalization. The success of the meetings organized within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a strong signal, as is the attention paid to the Chinese project of Global Governance to remedy the withdrawal of the American administration from the main international institutions whose role was precisely to set the rules of a world where cooperation between states was a condition for peace and prosperity for all.
The weight of Western countries in the world economy and in trade is still largely in the majority, but year after year it is declining and its position is threatened by the rise of relations between China and the countries of the Global South. Twelve years ago, the launch of the New Silk Road programs strengthened ties between Beijing and its neighbors and even spread to Africa and South America. It was based on major investments in infrastructure. Everyone was a winner. The host countries were going to have the equipment they lacked. China offered work to its companies that carried out the work and would take advantage of this infrastructure to transport its exports.
Today, there are countless large Chinese companies that will invest in these partner countries, promoting their development and finding new customers while in turn benefiting from much lower production costs than in their own country. The boom in trade between these countries is spectacular and will benefit Chinese companies, which find it a growth driver at a time when consumption in their country is becoming less dynamic.
The figures for Chinese foreign trade in the 1st quarter of 2025 are revealing. Their growth was only 1.4% with the European Union and 4% with the United States. But it was 7 percent with ASEAN, which includes a 10.5 percent increase with Vietnam and 16.5 percent with Thailand. The volume of Chinese exports to Germany is now significantly lower than that to Vietnam. As for France, it is well below Malaysia and Indonesia.
This shift has not yet translated into an increase in trade using the Chinese currency, although the internationalization of the yuan has been a government priority for nearly fifteen years. This currency still has a small share in transactions and in central bank reserves, where it is only in 5th position after the dollar, the euro, the yen and the pound sterling, although the ECB decided in 2017 to acquire it, albeit at a symbolic level. But the threats of sanctions associated with the use of the dollar will constitute a strong incentive in the future to use the yuan and thus to relaunch the process of its internationalization.
The idea that we were moving towards the end of globalization and the isolation caused by the rise of protectionist barriers is therefore a misconception. Globalization has allowed developed countries to experience unprecedented enrichment, even if it has often been poorly distributed. China has learned this lesson and has transformed its business model by basing it on market mechanisms, research and innovation so that its companies acquire the capabilities to compete with their competitors.
Reducing Beijing's influence to its dominant position in rare earths is a mistake. Advances in robotics, for example, are spectacular. Exports, which were below $400 million in 2020, are expected to approach $1.7 billion in 2025. And at the end of last year, there were more than 2 million in operation, making the country the world's largest user. Beijing has also accompanied this strategy with a considerable effort to forge "win-win" relations with as many partners as possible.
We must not sink into denial of reality by invoking the rise in international tensions to withdraw into ourselves. New geographical and technological opportunities are emerging. It will be the great challenge of the twenty-first century to seize them by continuing to create wealth in order to have the means to meet another challenge, that of protection against climate risks.