At a time when international tensions are rising and the need for a solid and united Europe has never been stronger, one country, Poland, closely affected by the threats resulting from these tensions, elects an openly Eurosceptic far-right president. A period of cohabitation began with the government of Donald Tusk, a convinced European and very committed to finding a solution to the Ukrainian crisis. The case of Poland is not isolated. The next day, the leader of the Dutch far-right party, Geert Wilders, left the coalition, forcing Prime Minister Schoof to resign and call elections. The coming to power of Georgia Meloni in Italy, and the breakthrough of the National Rally in France and the AfD in Germany testify to the discontent aroused by Brussels.
Never has resentment towards the European project been so pronounced. These political parties are taking advantage of the concern about the rise in immigration and are blaming Europe for the deterioration in the standard of living and living conditions of a growing part of the population that no longer has confidence in the left or in the social democratic formations to protect them and to guarantee them a fair share of the distribution of economic wealth.
This may seem paradoxical at a time when Europe's role should be essential in resolving the ongoing crises that have brought the war to its doorstep. But in a world with extreme media coverage, the Union suffers from its lack of incarnation. The United States has Trump, Russia has Putin and China has Xi Jinping. Brussels has no one. The presidency of the Union is purely formal and the President of the Commission does not have the responsibility of speaking on behalf of the States in her mandate. For a growing number of voters, Europe has no solutions to these crises and if it did, it has no one to defend them and make them accepted.
The principles on which the European model was built are no longer adapted to today's world, resulting in both low growth and rising inequality. The liberalisation of trade with the creation of the single market and the opening of borders meant that the world would take this path. The policy led by Donald Trump has given the lie to the question. The use of relocations, particularly to China, was based on the bet that European companies would benefit from new and large markets and low production costs, which would guarantee their future prosperity. Today, we can see that China is no longer the "factory of the world" but the cradle of companies that are becoming formidable competitors, such as in the automotive sector.
Another contested principle is free and undistorted competition, which even came close to being included in a constitutional treaty. Its implementation has slowed down and sometimes even prevented the creation of European groups capable of imposing themselves on the world market. Airbus has provided proof of this necessity but has remained an exception. The opening up of public services to competition has not brought the expected progress, both in terms of prices and the quality of services offered to consumers. The impossibility of using public procurement, a major tool of industrial policy, to strengthen the productive fabric and support innovation, has contributed, along with the bureaucratic environment, to initiating the process of deindustrialization that is affecting several countries.
Finally, the rules on public finances and taxation have proved to be completely inadequate, since today none of the major economies in the euro area is able to comply with them. The principle of unanimity in the field of direct taxation has allowed tax havens to continue to prosper to the detriment of the revenues of other members. "Letterbox" companies in Luxembourg, where you only need to be domiciled to locate your profits and not pay tax, continue to prosper. American and Japanese manufacturers have chosen Ireland to have their products "packaged" and shipped back to their customers. Thanks to artificial transfer prices, they locate their profits there and benefit, to the detriment of other European countries, from an abnormally low tax rate.
The Maastricht rules on public finances have obscured the essential question of spending: what is it for? So are countries like Germany, with a military budget of around 1% of GDP for thirty years, more virtuous than France, which spends twice as much? Given the current international tensions, the situation is damning. What must be taken into account is the independence from the outside world and the solvency of the country, measured by their current account balances and by the financial savings rate of their households. On these two points, France and Italy, although denounced as bad students, have satisfactory results and therefore do not pose a threat to the financial stability of the euro zone.
These principles of very liberal inspiration, and this is not the least of the paradoxes, have been accompanied by a bureaucratic drift of a magnitude unique in the world. It stems from the structure of the institutions. The absence of an incarnation at the head of the Union has allowed the Commission to exercise its power in a technocratic way by multiplying regulations with serious consequences on the daily lives of citizens as well as on the activity of companies and farms. This drift has also had a detrimental effect on growth. How can we impose on producers a multitude of standards that affect their costs and productivity while allowing the same products to enter freely from countries that do not impose such standards on themselves?
As they were not subject to a vote, these practices were experienced by many Europeans as a denial of the democratic values to which they were attached. The way in which the campaign for the elections to the European Parliament took place in most countries has further increased this feeling of rupture. It was as if, in the absence of programs proposed by the candidates, it was only a full-scale survey before the next national consultations to come. The head of state, in France, feeling disowned, dissolved the National Assembly.
The world has changed. The European project in the aftermath of the war made it possible to invent a social model that offered the continent growth and prosperity. Above all, after centuries of devastating conflicts, it has ensured peace between peoples. This historical legacy must not be forgotten. But it is no longer enough to maintain all these gains in today's new and violent world. Rather than arguing about budget ratios, which are not always representative of real situations, or trying to impose their domination over industrial activities, those in charge in Brussels and in each capital would do better to think about adapting the European model to the new world in which we now live.
Europe is indispensable but not perfect. Its model was not designed to protect its members against the triple threat of new and fierce Chinese competition, an isolationist withdrawal from the United States and an aggressive policy by Russia.
Paul Valéry wrote in 1919 that we civilizations now know that we are mortal. This reflection is highly topical and it is up to political leaders to become aware of it and to reconcile their peoples with the European project. Otherwise, Paul Valéry's concern risks becoming reality.