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AB 2000 studies

Alain Boublil Blog

 

France: where are we?

Four months ago, we perceived some improvement. Following the publication of a drop in unemployment in January, we wondered, two months ago, if the recovery was finally here. So where are we really now? Commentators are optimistic. But this is a kind of forced optimism. Members of the government cannot react otherwise. The Minister of Labour is doing his job when he notices that, arithmetically, the monthly increase of unemployment in the first quarter is low, even if it is mostly due to the exceptional decrease observed in January.

Nevertheless one can tell him that the number of full-time job seekers increased over the past twelve months (+ 163 000) – which is also an indisputable and unsatisfying figure – and even more since May 2012 (+ 585 000). There is also what could be called forced optimism. The companies, including the biggest ones have benefited from considerable tax and expenses cuts for two years. Their representatives have a vested interest to be optimistic - although this is not entirely consistent with the reality – in order to show that this strategy "works". They neutralize thereby potential criticism and seem legitimate when they ask for more cuts.

So where are we really? The employment figures do not suggest a lasting improvement. The same thing happened at the end of 2013. We noticed then an increase in pay rolls, which is a far more important indicator to measure the trend in employment. We know what happened next. Economists reason differently. Three factors that are supposed to be favourable happened in six months: the triple lowering of interest rates, oil prices and the euro. People say indeed: "This new context carries with it all the elements of the recovery, so it will happen if it is not already there". This sounds like the Coue method. For the real effects of this unprecedented drop are not so obvious even if one should not underestimate the importance of these phenomena.

First, the interest rate cuts benefit less the economy than the stock market. The state continues to minimize their impact on the burden of debt, despite the fact that they could give it the fiscal space it is missing. The state has even predicted that the burden of debt will increase in 2016 and 2017. This goes against logic and amounts to reality denial. When looking at its issuance policy, it even seems that the state does everything it can to reduce the impact of the interest rate cuts on public finances. The state continues to issue with past rates, pocketing substantial premiums - eight billion since the beginning of the year -, which are not accounted for in the deficit.

There is no impact either on companies. While one seeks to stimulate growth by lowering rates in Frankfurt, one enacts prudential norms in Basel to discourage banks from lending to businesses and insurance companies in order to provide them with equity capital. The government has become aware of this contradiction and appointed a banker to assess the situation and draw up proposals. Moreover the tax on the shares, in France, has been hardened bringing down consequently the number of individual shareholders. It is therefore not surprising to see our companies being bought back by their foreign competitors. Despite this seemingly favourable context, one does not perceive any recovery in investment, which is logical. Optimism is not justified.

Will recovery come from the decrease in oil prices and the decline of the euro? Nothing is less certain. First, the two decreases work in opposite directions. The decline of the euro reduces the positive impact on the economy of lower oil prices. Over the last six months, the oil bill has been reduced by 9 billion instead of 12 billion (if the euro would have maintained its level). The impact on the consumer, due to the weight of taxation and the rebalancing of refining margins, should not, moreover, be overestimated, especially as it will be taken into consideration in the calculation of inflation and remuneration trends – such as the SMIC and other benefits.

The effects of this decline have been praised yet largely neutralized. One can even say that for a Parisian, who has just experienced a threefold increase in parking rates, which do not seem included in the price index, the loss of purchasing power is real. But the proponents of devaluation say that this will improve the "competitiveness" of companies and that this will benefit growth and employment. This is a well-known chorus. Except that this reasoning has always been proved wrong by the facts. The countries with weak currencies have not benefited to foreign trade. Let’s just look at the situations of the United States and England in the last ten years and compare them with the performances of Germany and Italy - to say nothing about Switzerland. The devaluation increases the cost of imports before making an illusory benefit for exports, which is quickly compensated by the increase in domestic prices resulting from a weak currency.

The case of France is even worse because more than half of our exports are in the euro zone and the exports of our two main competitors - Germany and Italy - are in the euro zone as well. So we do not have much to gain from this decline, except, and this is significant, in the field of tourism that should beat new records in 2015. This is no bad news but this sector cannot alone offset the difficulties of all others. Over the last three years, construction industry beat down the growth of our economy, which could have benefited from the lower rates if the multiple standards, administrative decision-making centres and regulations that paralyze new construction would have been reviewed. But this is not the path that was chosen, quite the contrary.

The decline in the euro against the dollar brings a real benefit to some big companies that have invested outside the euro zone and undertaken there a significant part of their activities. This benefit is immediate, effortless and finds expression in the stock price, and consequently in the remuneration of its managers, whose performance criteria are sensitive to exchange rates. So it is easy and it is big, but it has a drawback: expressed in foreign currency, the value of the company falls down as much, making it an easier prey.

To sum up, we should not expect miracles for the French economy from this triple decline and certainly not a return to a "normal" growth. The fact of knowing whether we will reach 1.1% or 1.2% this year stems from the "fetishism of the decimal" and does not make sense. Moreover, the government seems to be satisfied with this evolution compared to the five years close to stagnation that France has just known. But with a growth rate that is well below 2%, unemployment will remain very high and that will paralyze the behaviour of consumers and deter companies from investing. For, quoting the words of a great boss who has just left us, "in a company, the most important person is the customer". It was François Michelin. He himself knew how "real economy" works.